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An attorney who refuses to pay over money belonging to his client will be ordered to do so on motion of the client.
A contract between attorney and client that if anything is recovered the attorney
is to receive one-half the amount obtained, after deducting expenses, is void for
ehamperty.
MOTION

for an order of court.

James Tillinghast, for the petitioner.
Oscar A. Tanner,pro se ipso.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
complainant asks this court for an order on
POTTER, J. -The
one of its attorneys requiring him to pay over certain money which
he received in a suit brought for the complainant, and also for the
money which the complainant paid said attorney for expenses, and
for what the complainant has lost by the discontinuance of his case
by the said attorney.
Some of the facts alleged by the complainant are denied by the
respondent, but we think the undisputed facts in the case are sufficient to justify and require us to make an order against the respondent.
The complainant alleges that he placed in the respondent's hands
for collection a claim for $593.18 against Thomas Pray, on an
"agreement that if anything was recovered the attornef was to take
for his compensation one-half the amount obtained after deducting
expenses. The complainant paid down to the respondent certain
sums for expenses. A suit was brought, and the defendant's funds
in a certain bank attached to the amount of 5765.59. The defendant afterwards became bankrupt, but not until more than four
months had elapsed after the attachment. The respondent afterwards discontinued the suit on receiving from Mr. Lapham, the
attorney for the bankrupt defendant, the sum of $100. And of the
receipt of this sum he gave the complainant no information.
The respondent's defence is that as it was doubtful whether he
could recover, he had a right to compromise or discontinue the suit,
and he agreed to do so on the defendant's attorney agreeing to pay
him $100, which he says was for his attorney's fees and not as a
part of the claim sued for.
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The relation of attorney and client is a relation implying the utmost confidence and trust on the part of the client reposed in the
attorney, and a corresponding obligation on the part of the attorney
towards the client, which he should endeavor to perform faithfully,
not merely from a sense of duty to his client, but from a sense of
honor, as a member of an honorable profession whose character and
estimation depend upon the individual character and reputation of
its members. This relation implies that he is to look to his client
alone for his compensation. To receive any compensation from the
opposite party or his attorney, without the consent of his own client,
is a breach of the trust reposed in him by his employer.
We regret that we are obliged to say this. But if, as the
respondent contends, he did as he did because other attorneys of this
court have indulged in such practices, while that fact may lessen
the blame in this particular case, it becomes all the more necessary
that the court should express its opinion that the practice is deserving of the severest censure, and utterly inconsistent with that character of honesty and honor which should belong to all the members
of the profession.
And we feel bound to notice another fact which appears in the
proceedings. According to the allegation of the complainant, and
which is not plainly denied, the original agreement for compensation
was champerty, and constitutes an indictable offence; and the practice, if it has become a practice, of making such agreements should
be discouraged and condemned; and if in the course of legal proceedings in any case any such agreement should come to the notice
of the court,*%ve shall feel obliged to refer it to the attorney-general
for his official action.
The charge of $100 was out of all proportion to the services rendered ; but as he had no right whatever to take pay for his services
from the opposite party, we must treat it as received for the use of
the client, the complainant.
As there is no dispute about the receipt of this sum of $100, we
shall make an order for the payment of it to the complainant and
without any deduction. We think that is as far as we can go on
the present application.
Order accordingly.
1. Upon the first point arising in this
case, there is no question as to the control of courts over their attorneys to enforce by summary process the prompt

payment to clients of money
for them. Such attorneys are
debtors to their clients, liable
tion at law for money had and

collected
not only
to an acreceived,
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like any otheragents, but are also offlcers of the court, subject to their order-.
bound to obey their decrees, and punishable for not doing so. The court
may therefore, upon motion, direct the
payment of a client's money, and in
case of neglect or refusal imprison the
attorney, or even strike his name from
the rolls. See l re Bleakley, 5 Paige
311 (1835).
And see Dann v. V-anner.son, 7 How. (Miss.) 579 (1843).
And the.imprisonment in such cases
is not an imprisonmentjor debt, but for
a contempt of court. Bankruptcy proceedings are no bar, and although utterly unable to pay the amount, the attorney has no right to a discharge upon
habeas corpus. .Snith v. McLendon, S.
C. Georgia, (Aug. T. 1877), 6 Reporter
139.
On such an application the attorney
can be compelled to pay only what he
has in fact collected for his client, and
not in that mnode ofproceeding, any amount
he failed or neglected to collect when ho
might have done so. Croft v. Hic-s, 26
Texas 383 (1862).
But a motion for such purpose is
entertained only on motion of the client.
It is a privilege given to clients for their
protection against exactions and overreachings, which the attorney, by reason of the confidence placed in him by
his client,' might resort to. But this
extraordinary remedy is not extended to
outside parties, or assignees of clients.
Hessv. Joseph. 7 Robertson (N. Y.) 609
(1867).
Therefore when an attorney, in settling
an account with an executor who had
employed him, retainea in his hands a
legacy duty to be paid to the stamp
office, the latter could not apply by this
summary process to have the attorney
ordered to pay it over. In re Fenton, 3
Ad. & E. 404 (1835).
2. As to the question of champerty there
is no little difference of opinion. The
first view is that a contract is void where
an attorney agrees to carry on the suit
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and pay or advance the expenses of litigation, or to indvinnif\- the client a:mn,.st
the saame, for some share of the proceeds, land or money. The English dcci-ions are so unifbrm on this saljvev it
is unnecessary to cite them Jicre. As
proof of the steady adherence to the old
rule, the learned reader is referred to
the recent case of llilton v. Ilioods, Law
Rep. 4 Eq. 432 (1867).
And come American courts have
adopted the English rule in all it- vigor.
2hu'stv:, v.1'creial,I P'ick. 415 (1821),
is perhaps the leading case in Amner'ca.
Oi this point.
Rhode Island, in an important ease,
in 1866, adopted the same view. Martin v. Clarke, 8 R. . 389. And see
Coquillardv. Beares,21 Ind. 479 t1869 1;
btfferty v. Jelley, 22 Id. 471 (1864) ;.
Byrd v. Odem, 9 Ala. 755 (1846) ; Ito!.
loway v. Lowe, 7 Porter 488 (18.38) ;
Elliott v.McClelland 17 Ala. 206 1850;.
Key v. Vattier, I Ohio 132 (1823)
l1'eakley v. all, 13 Id. 167 (rS44) .
Brown v. Beauchamp, 5 T. B. Mon.
413 (1827) ; Thompson v. W~arren, 8 13.
Mon. 488 (1848); Boardman Y. Brmen,
25 Iowa 487 (1868), reviewing tIecases; Sutterlee v. Frazer, 2 Sand. 14L
(1848); Berrien v. McLane, I Hoff.
Ch. 421 (1840); Mferritt v. Lami,rr,
10 Paige 352 (1843), affirmed in 2 De.
nio 607; 9earns v. Felker, 28 Wis. 594(1871).
The common-law rule does not grow
out of the relation of solicitor and client, but applies equally to others; and
in England an agreement by one not an
attorney to procure information and furnish evidence to enable another to substantiate his claim, upon condition of
receiving a portion of the proceeds, is
invalid. Stanley v. Jones, 7 Bing. 369 ;
5 M. & P. 193 (1831).
And see Sprye
v. Porter, 7 E. & B. 58 (1856) ; Reynell v. Sprye, 8 Hare 222 (1849) ; . .
I D., U. & G. 660.
On the other hand in some states the
old common-law rule is altogether repudi-
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ated, and it is held that no such contract
i. now invalid, unless it contravenes
sone exi-ting statute of the state. Such
was the carefully considered case of
Std,prick v. Stanton, 14 N. Y. 289
(1$56) ; .)urin v. Ireland, Id. 322.
And such, perhaps owing to their code
allowing attorneys to make any agreement with their clients, is probably the
establis-hed .law in New York : lioorhees

the evils resulting from officious intermeddling, and upholding another's litigation by personal services as well as
money ; more dangerous formerly than
now, as more powerful combinations
were resorted to with a view of controlling, if not overawing, the judicial tribunals."
The same view was entirely
approved in the well considered cases of
Scobey v. Ross, 13 Ind. 117 (1859), and
v. Dorr, 51 Barb. 580 (1868) ; RiclBackts v. Bddrns, 4 Mich. 535 (1857).
And the Court of Appeals in Kenard.,on v. iwland, 40 Conn. 572 (1873),
tucky had declared twenty years before
a decision on a contract made in New
York, and, therefore, governed by the that Hawkins's definition was correct,
laws thereof.
and that it was not essential that the atThe same rule exists in California and torney carry on the suit at his own expense. Rust v. "Ltrue,4 Litt. 419 t 1823).
perhaps other states. Matf.hewson v.
_FitcI, 22 Cal. 86 (1863); loffman v. And see Davis v. Sharron, 15 B. Mon.
bdlhjo, 45 Id. 564 (1873.)
And see 64 (1854), decided however upon a stat_L1tle v. The .5rote, 17 Ark. 609 (1857).
ute of Kentucky.
The second class of cases make it unOn the other hand some very respectable courts hold such agreement an essenimportr.rt whether the attorney or the
client q-e io pay the expenses. Most tial feature to constitute champertv, and
notably in this class perhaps is the case declare that a mere agreement to divide
of IaIhrop v. Amherst Bank, 9 Met. 489 the proceeds, with no undertaking or
(1845), in which the pointwas distinctly obligation to pay any part of the expenmade, and overruled. DEwEY, J., said ses is not invalid. Allard v. Landrande,
upon this point, "It was suggested in 29 Wis. 502 (1872), is a carefully considthe argument that the facts here shown ered case on that precise point. And so
do not bring the case strictly within the are Bay;ardv. M11cLane, 3 Harrington 139
dfinition of chaivperty, as the plaintiff (1839:; Benedict v. Stuart, 23 Barb. 420
was not to conduct the suit wholly at his (1856) ; Moses v. Bagley, 55 Geo. 283
-own expense, but was, in the event of a (1875).
Such is the rule in Missouri. Duke v.
"failure to sustain the action, to he re11arper, 5 Reporter 624 (Oct. T. 1877)
muncrated for his actual expenses. It
is true that some of the elementary 66 Mo.
As to a per centage on the amount recobooks, in defining champerty, say that
' the champertor is to carry on the suit vered. The courts of the United States
at his own expense,' as 4 B1. Com. 135; allow attorneys to stipulate for a -reaChit. Cont. (5th Am. ed.) 675. Other sonable per centage of the amount recobooks of equal authority omit this part vered, as a compensation for services.
ll',liev. Core, 15 How. 415 (1853), five
of the definition of champerty ; as in I
Hawk. c. 84,
I ; Co. Litt. 368 b. per cent. ; llliqht v. Jebbitts, 91 U. S.
Maintenance and champerty, if we are Rep. 252 (1875) ten per cent.
But in many courts a contract to pay
to judge from the'manner in which they
are usually introduced in connexion a solicitor dny per centum of the amount
with this subject, are deemed illegal, recovered is open-to objection. Strange
not from the consideration that all the -. Brennan, 16 Sin. 346 (1846); afexpenses of the litigation are to be firmed in 2 C. P. Cooper I ; Thurstonv.
borne by a stranger, but in reference to Percival, 1 Pick. 415 (1821) ; Lathrop
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v. Amherst Bank, 9 Met. 491 ; Elliott V.

have distinctly recognised the validity

Mcoleland, 17 Ala. 206 (1850); Pwine
v. B3eattie, 32 Law J. Ch. iN. S.) 734
(1863).
As to contiagent .fes. The English
courts are decidedly opposcd to the validitv of a contract between attorney

of such contracts. Staniton v. Einrey.
93 U. S. Rep. 548 (1876) ; Ec4 phire
Plitt, 2 Wtall. ,Jr. 453 (1853) ; ,tn
v. ladt.kin, 1 MacArthur 558 (1874).
And so have some of the state courts.
Allardv. Lamirande, 29 Wisconsin 502 ;
(1872) ; Xewkirk v. Cone, 18 Ill. 449
And this is allowed by statute
(1857).
in New York. itch v. Gardn r, 2 Keyes
616 ; Iletchlngs v. Van Brunt, 38 N. Y.
39 N. Y. Supe335 ; Porter v. Parly,
rior Court 232.
In Iowa also a contract for a contingent fee is upheld, there being no agreement that the attorney pay expenses, nor
that the client should not settle the case,
" nor any other objectionable matters
pointed out in Boardmn v. Brown, 25

and client for a contingent fee dependant upon success in a suit, especially
when the attorney is to advance all sums
necessary to carry on the litigation.
Earle v. Ilop-rood, 10 C. B. N. S. 566
(1861), in which the client stipulated to
pay his attorney "over and above all
legal costs and charges incurred, a sum
of money according to the interest and
benefit to him from the poisession of the
estate in litigation, and sutficient to
compensate and reward the attorney for
making the advances, and incurring the
liabilities, and devoting his utmost skill,
care and labor in instituting and carrying on and defending the proceedings,"
the client being without means of paying
in case of failure. Under this agreement
the plaintiff brought suit for 30,0001.
Upon demurrer the court gave judgment
for the defendant, saying that the bargain
fell precisely within the rule as to maintenance. The only difference being that
in the former the party would have the
security of the property, whereas here
be has only the personal security of the
defendant. But if the defendant be a
solvent man, lie gets a share of the property by another mode, viz., by suing
him and obtaining judgment.
On the other hand, tile Supreme Court
of the United States, in a recent case,

Iowa 489."
Railroad Co.,
Under ttis
may perhaps
which while

JMcDonahl v. Chicago ,"29 Iowa 171 (1870).
head of contingent ftes
be ranked those cases
they refuse to allow an.

attorney to have a direct interest in the
subject-matter of a suit, do allow him
to stipulate for compensation to an
amount equal to one-half of the amount
recovered ; it being, they say, a client's
right to regulate his attorney's fee by the
value of one-half the property in contest,
as well as by the value of any other property. See llildte v. Roberts, 4 l)ana
172 (1836) ; Evans v. Bth, 6 Id. 479
(1838) ; Rainsy v. Trent, 10 B. Mon.
But this is certainly ap341 (1850).
proaching very near the line.
EDMUND H. BENNETT.

Supreme Court Comnmission qf Ohio.
THE ERIE RAILWAY COMPANY v. E. T. STRINGER.
In regard to the jurisdiction of the federal courts, a corporation is a citizen
of the state by which it'wa created.
A foreign railroad corporation does not become an Ohio corporation or a citizen
of Ohio by merely leasing, possessing and operating in that state, the property of
an Ohio railroad company.
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The Ohio statute in regard to corporations, of March 19th 1S69, so far as it
priivi-ls tat the leasing antd operating of an Ohio railroad by a foreign company
.hall lie taken as a waiver of the right to remove cases brought against it to the
United States court, is repugnant to the Con-titution anl Laws of tileUnited
Stie, and it, thereforC tdoes not create a statutory waiver of that right.
When a foreign corporation is tul bv a citizen of the state in a state court, it
isentitled to have the case removed to a federal court under the statutes of the
United States.
"rie several rulings in the case of the D. 6- 0. -RailroadCo. v. Cary, 28 Ohio
St. 208, rc-affirmnil.
Where in ai action pending in itstate court, the petition of the defendant for
the transfer of the case to a Circuit Court of the Unitetl States is improperly overruled, such defendant is not bound, in order to preserve his right of removal, to
disregard the overruling of his application, and proccel to.perfect the transfer of
his case, but wav, without akantloning such right, remain in the state court, and
prevent, if pow-ible, the prejudicial effect of its erroneous, ruling by all the means
authorized b the laws of the state.

O-' June 2d 1870, the defendant in error filed his petition, in the
Court of Common Pleas of Ashland county, agiiinst the Eric Railway Company, to recover damages for being wrongfully ejected from
a passenger train by a conductor of the defendants' train. Ile
claimed damages in the sum of $5000. Process was issued and duly
served upon one of the compa'ny's station agents. On September
5th, the plaintiff in error, being a corporation created and organized under the laws of the state of |New York, filed its petition in
the ordinary form to remove the case for trial into the Circuit Court
of the United States, and at the same time tendered a bond in
accordance with the Act of Congress.
The defendant in error filed an answer, int"er alia, as follows:
" That said Erie Railway Company did lease from the Atlantic
and Great Western Railway Company, tle exclusive right to the
use and control of said road for the term of
years from and
after the making of said lease; that a portion of the said Atlantic
and Great Western Railway so leasedl by the said Erie Railway
Company as aforesaid is in the state of Ohio.
"That at the time of the committing of the grievances com-

plained of by him in his petition filed in this case, and for which
he has brought suit, the said Erie Railway Company were the lessees of the Atlantic and Great Western Railway Company. and as
such lessees, by force of the statute, &c., waived their right to
remove this cause from this court, as prayed f6r in said petition."
To this answer the plaintiff in error replied that it did not operate said Atlantic and Great Western Railway under the lease from
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the said Atlantic and Great Western Railway Company, such as is
contemplated by the said statute. but under a permission or lease
made and given by Reuben Hitchcock, a receiver of the "Mil Atlantic and Great Western Railway- Company, appointed by the
Court of Common Pleas of Summit eouinty. Ohio, and under the
authority of the said last-named court during the pendency of a
certain action therein pending.
The lease referred to attached to this reply bore date February
24th 1870, .nd was a contract between Reuben Hitchcock, as the
receiver of the Atlantic and Great Western Railway Company,
setting forth that it is made in pursuance of an order of the Court
of Common Pleas of Summit county, Ohio, and an order of the
Supreme Courts of the states of New York and of Pennsylvania.
The lease, by its terms, was to continue through the receivership
of the said Hitchcock, the lessor, unless sooner put an end to by
order of the court upon cause shown, and by the terms of the lease
the Erie Railway Company was to maintain the road in good order
and operate it for seventy per cent. of the gross earnings thereof.
At the October term of 1870, the following decision was made
by the court:
"This case came on to be heard upon a petition, answer, reply
and exhibits, on consideration whereof the court find that the petitioner is a citizen of the state of New York ; that the said E. T.
Stringer is a citizen of the state of Ohio ; that the amount in controversy exceeds 5500, exclusive of costs; that the said Atlantic
and Great Western Railway Company is an Ohio corporation and
railroad in the state of Ohio, and that the petitioner is in possession of and running -and operating said Atlantic and Great Westera Railway under the lease or instrument attached to the replication ; and therefore the court hold and adjudge Ihat, by virtue of
the act of the legislature of Ohio, passed March 19th 1869, the
petitioner waived its right to remove said cause to the Circuit Court
of the United States, and refuse to allow the prayer of the petitioner, and order the said petition to be dismissed; to which ruling of the court the said Erie Railway Company except."
After the overruling of its petition for removal the Erie Railway
Company filed, under protest, its answer to the petition of the
defendant in error against it, to which the defendant in error replied,
and the issue thus made up between the parties was twice tried by
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a jury, the plaintiff in error having demanded a second trial under
the statute.
On the second trial the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff below.
A motion was made to set aside the verdict, which was overruled
by the court, and judgment was entered against the plaintiff in
error. A bill of exceptions was taken upon trial and the evidence
set forth in the record. A petition in error was filed in the District Court by the plaintiff in error, and the judgment of the Court
of Common Pleas was affirmed. A petition in error was then filed
in this court to reverse the judgment of the District Court and
the Court of Common Pleas. Among the errors assigned both in
the District Court and here was that the Court of Common Pleas
erred in overruling the petition for removal, and in proceeding with
the action after the filing of such petition,
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SCOTT, J.-The plaintiff in error is a corporation created solely
by the state of New York, and is therefore to be regarded as a
citizen of that state. And the fact that it is operating a railroad
of another corporation, part of -which lies within this state, under
a lease from 'the receiver of the latter corporation, does not give it
the character of an Ohio corporation or affect its status as a citizen
of New York. It was so held by this commission in the case of
the B. J- 0. Bailroad Co. v. C2y, 28 Ohio St. 208. And we see
no reason to doubt the correctness of the views there expressed,
and do not hesitate to reaffirm the doctrine of that case. Indeed,
it would not be otherwise, even if the plaintiff in error were the
absolute purchaser of the property and franchises which it is now
operating and using as a lessee: State v. Shernzan, 22 Ohio St.
411. The laws of this state which authorize foreign corporations
to make contracts and transact business within their appropriate
spheres of action, in thi state, do not purport to create domestic
corporations, but merely to permit and regulate the action within
this state of existing foreign corporations.
The plaintiff in error then being sued by a citizen of this state
in the Court of Common Pleas of Ashland county, had a right as
a citizen of another state (the .amount in controversy being more
than $500), to ask for the removal of the case into the Circuit
Court of the United States. Such right is clearly conferred by
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the Judiciary Act of Congress of 1789. Plaintiff in error, in due
time, exercised this right by petitioning in due form for such
removal, and complying in all respects with the requirements of
the Act of Congress in that belalf The Court of Common Pleas
overruled the application for removal, on the sole ground that by virtue of the Act of the Legislature of Ohio, passed March 19th 18619,
the petitioner had waived its right to such removal. The statutory
provision referred to is as follows: "Provided, that it shall be
regarded as one of the conditions upon which a railroad company
of another state may lease or purchase a railroad, the whole or any
part of which is in this state, or make any arrangement for operating the same under the provisions of this section that such railroad
company of another state thereby waives the right to remove any
case from any of the courts of this state to any of the courts of the
United States, or to bring a suit in any of the courts of the United
States against any citizen of this state; and a violation of such
condition shall operate as a forfeiture of all rights acquired under
such lease, purchase or arrangement:" 66 0. L. 33.
Was the Court of Common Pleas justified by this enactment of
the state legislature, in refusing the request for removal, and holding that the right of removal had been waived ?
The power of a state legislature to require a foreign corporation
to waive or forego the exercise of such right of removal, as a condition on which it is permitted to do business in this state, has
been expressly denied by the Supreme Court of the United States.
That tribunal of last resort in the determination of the question,
holds such state legislation to be in conflict with the constitution
and laws of the United States: Home Insurance Co. v. iorse,
20 Wall. 445 ; re-affirmed in -Doylev. ContinentalInsurance Co.,
4 Otto 535. And with proper deference we have followed and
conformed to those decisions in the cases of the Assurance Co. v.
Peirce, 27 Ohio St. 155, and B. J- 0. -Railroad Co. v. Cary,
supra. In conformity with these precedents it must be held that
the Court of Common Pleas erred in finding and ruling that the
plaintiff in error had waived its right of removal in virtue of the
state enactment on that subject.
" Nor did the plaintiff in error, defendant in the court below, by
proceeding in the cause under protest after its application for
removal had been overruled, waive or in any way lose the right to
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call in question the further jurisdiction of the Court of Common
Pleas: Idl, oy v. dunlap), 10 Ohio St. 1.
A proper case having been made by the defendant below for the
removal of thecause, the court had no discretion in the premises.
Its imperative duty was "to accept the surety and proceed no further in the cause against the petitioner." It had no longer any
rightfid jurisdiction of the cause: Gordon v. Longest, 16 Pet. 97.
And so long as the plaintiff in error continued to stand upon and
assert its rights of removal, and declined to recognise the rightfulness of the jurisdiction thereafter improperly assumed, all the subsequent orders and ju'dgments of the court, made and entered in the
exercise of such assumed jurisdiction, would be utterly invalid as
against the plaintiff in error. After the overruling of the application for removal, the defendant below submitted to the further jurisdiction of the Court of Common Pleas involuntarily and undei"
.protest. And after final judgment in that court, it declined to
waive or abandon its rights in that behalf; and, on the contrary,
continued their assertion, by seeking the reversal of such judgment
in the District Court, on the very ground of error in refusing to
grant its application for removal. And the District Court having
affirmed the judgment, plaintiff in error is now here still demanding
a reversal on the same ground. There has at no time been an acquiescence, on its part, in the exercise of the jurisdiction wrongfully
assumed by the Court of Common Pleas.
But defendant in error now alleges that plaintiff in error failed and
neglected to take the necessary steps to effect and perfect the removal
of the cause to the proper Circuit Court of the United States, after
the overruling of its application for removal; and it is claimed that
such failure and neglect, taken in connection with the fact of' its
remaining in the Court of Common Pleas, though under protest,
and demanding and exercising in that court its statutory right to a
second trial, constitute a waiver of its right to have the cause transferred to the Circuit Court.
We know of no case in -which it has ever been held that when
a petition for removal has been improperly denied, the petitioner is
bound, in order to prcserve his right of removal, -wholly to disregard
such denial of hii right, and see!: ani immediate remedy through thea

a.ction of the courts of the United States. On the contrary, a def-ndant in a state court may, without prejudice to his right, prevent
the injurious effect of its denial, if he can, by all the means author-
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ized by.the laws of the stat . And, where these means are exhausted
without effect, and his right has been denied by the highest tribunal
of the state, he may then appeal, by writ of error, to the Supreme
Court of the United States, the paramount and final arbiter of the
question. This was the very course adopted in the case of Gordon
v. Longest, supra. The idea does not appear to have occurred to
either court or counsel in that case, that the plaintiff in error had
lost his right to have the case transferred, by going to a trial in the
state court of original jurisdiction, or by prosecuting a writ of error
in the Court of Appeals of the state to reverse the judgment rendered against him. The Supreme Court of the United States said
that the defendant below might have pursued a more summary
remedy, but the cause having come into that court through the Supreme Court of the state, the judgment of affirmance by that court
was reversed, and the cause remanded, with instructions that it
should be transmitted to the court in which it originated, where an
allowance of the petition for removal was directed to be entered
nunc pro tune. And in Riddley v. Dunlap, supra, where the defendant's application for removal was improperly refused by the
Court of Common Pleas, and he thereupon proceeded to trial, and
then took an appeal to the District Court from the decree rendered
against him, and in the latter court renewed his application for a
transfer of the case, the question made by the renewed application
was reserved for the determination of the Supreme Court. It was
conceded by the learned counsel for complainant in that case, that
if the application for removal should have been granted by the
Court of Common Pleas, the defendant had not lost the right to
demand such removal by the trial in the court below, and the appeal of the case by the defendant. The court was of the same opinion, and ordered the ease to be certified to the proper Circuit Court.
In neither of these cases had the petitioner taken any steps after
the overruling of his petition to effect an actual transfer of the case.
In the case of Hatch v. The Ch., Bf. I. & Paciic Railroad Co.,
6 Blatch. C. C. R. 105, it is said by Judge BLATCHFORD, "The
right of the defendant to a removal is not dependent on the question whether the state court does or does not make an order for the
removal. If it were so dependent, the refusal of the state court
in a proper case to make such an order would make it impossible
for the defendant to secure the removal except by carrying the suit
through the state tribunal and then carrying it from the highest
VoL. XXVI.-97
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state tribunal to the Supreme Court of the United States, under
the 25th sect. of the Judiciary Act of 1789. A defendant is not,
however, where a state court is improperly proceeding in a cause
in violation of the 12th sect. of the Act of 1789, restrictedto such
mode of relief. Where the right to remove a cause is complete,
the power of the state court in respect to the cause is at an end,
and the defendant is not obliged to follow the cause further in any
state court, either of original or appellate jurisdiction: .Kanause v.
Maartin, 15 Howard 198. If he does all that is necessary to secure
a removal, then whether the state court makes an order of removal
or not, he can perfect the removal by entering in this court at -the
proper time copies of the proper papers, and his appearance and
special bail if necessary. When tl~it is done, the cause will proceed in this court."
This language clearly implies that whilst a defendant may disregard the refusal of the state court to allow the removal, and may
perfect such removal without an order of allowance, yet that he is
not bound to adopt this summary mode of effecting a transfer, and
his failure to do so is no waiver of his right to call in question the
continuing jurisdiction of the state court.
We find-it unnecessary to consider the other errors assigned in
this case. The judgments of both the courts below will be reversed,
and the cause be remanded to the Court of Common Pleas, with instructions to certify the case to the proper Circuit Court of the
United States.
JoimN, C. J., dissenting.-I most respectfully dissent from
the opinion just announced, on two grounds.
1. I do not think the plaintiff in error was a citizen of another
state, and as such entitled to a removal to the Circuit Court of the
United States. Although the Erie Railway Company was chartered
by the state of New York, and is, as to all causes of action growing out of the exercise of all corporate powers conferred by that
state, " a citizen of another state" for the purpose of a removal,
yet as the lessee of this road and.franchises of the Atlantic & Great
Western Railroad Company, an Ohio corporation, and as to causes
of action growing out of the exercise of corporate powers directly
derived from Ohio laws under said lease, I think it stands in the
shoes of the lessor. The reasons for this conclusion are given in
my dissent in the B. & 0. Railroad Co. v. Cary, 28 Ohio St. 216,
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and need not be repeated. Since that dissent was written the Court
of Appeals of Virginia have unanimously affirmed the doctrine there
claimed, and have endorsed that dissent with their approval. That
court holds, that where a railroad company incorporated by another
state leases a railroad lying in this state and operates it.as owner,
and an injury occurs on said road, the person having a right of
action for such injury may sue in the courts of this state, and such
company has no right to remove the suit to the federal court: B.
0. Railroad Co. v. ligktman, Va. L. J. 115, December 1877.
See also McGregor v. Erie Railway Co., 6 Vroom (N. J.) 115.
The second ground of dissent is, that the record shows an abandonment of the purpose to remove the cause, and a consent of the
company to again submit the cause to the state court. The record
shows that after the petition and bond were filed, the company
utterly failed and neglected to perfect the removal to the Circuit
Court by filing copies of the papers, as required by.Act of Congress, and after the time had elapsed for so doing, waived its right
to such removal, by a trial of the case without objection. That a
party possesses the power to abandon his purpose to remove his
cause after petition and bond filed, either by a withdrawal of the
papers filed for that purpose or otherwise cannot be successfully
disputed ; that he possesses equal power to waive his right in an
action pending as well after he has filed his petition and bond for
a removal as before, seems to me to be too clear for argument. It
is a personal right which may be waived as such case arises, at the
option of the non-resident citizen. This was expressly decided in
Insurance Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 451, where it was held, that a
general waiver in advance by a citizen of another state of his right
of removal was void, yet, " in a civil case he may submit his particular case in suit by his own consent to an arbitration or to the
decision of a single judge; so he may omit to exercise his right to
remove his suit to a federal tribunal as often as he sees fit in each
recurring case. In these aspects any citizen may no doubt waive
the rights to which he is entitled."
In Hfome 1ns. Co. v. Curtis, 32 MIich. 402, the defendant, a
foreign corporation, on the 20th of December 1873, filed a petition
and bond for a removal in proper form, but made no motion for a
removal, nor called the attention of the court to the fact. November 25th 1874, the parties went to trial without objection, and without questioning the jurisdiction of the state court. It was held,
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all the judges concurring, that "whatever rights the company may
have had upon the filing of the bond and petition, it could waive
and it certainly, under the circumstances of this case, must be considered as having waived them." " The company could not go to
trial upon .the merits, take its chances upon the result and afterwards
question the jurisdiction of the court." That a party can waive
his right to a removal as well after as before the filing of his petition and bond, has been settled by the unanimous decision of this
court in case of Pollock v. Cohen, in which the opinion is now being
prepared, and will soon be reported. In that case the plaintiff,
after his petition and bond in due form had been filed, his motion
overruled and his exceptions entered, proceeded to trial without
further objection, which resulted in a verdict and judgment against
him.
He took the case on error to the District Court, but in assigning
his errors, omitted to assign the overruling of the motion to remove
as error. On error to this court, it is held that by this omission
he waived the error and must be deemed to have waived his right
of removal.
As the facts in the case at bar make a much stronger case of
waiver than that of Pollock v. Cohen, I am unable to see how
the two cases can be reconciled. That there was a waiver in this
case and a full consent to a final trial in the Common Pleas is conclusively shown by the record.
The action was commenced June 2d 1870. The petition' and
bond for removal were filed September 5th 1870.
By the weight of authority, no action or order of the state court
is required to perfect his right to a removal, and without such action
the company miAht have filed the transcript in the Circuit Court
and thus perfecte.d a transfer of the case. It could have done this
even if the court had refused to order a removal. At the October
Term 1870, the order of removal was refused and exception was
noted.
The bond which was filed with the petition; September 5th, was
conditioned that the company would on or before the first day of
the next session of the Circuit Court, file therein copies of the
papers as required by the Act of Congress. The next session of
the Circuit Court for the Northern District of Ohio commenced on
the first Tuesday of October, the next on the first Tuesday of January,
and the next on the first Tuesday of April. The case was finally
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tried April 26th 1871, so that three terms had passed. November
9th 1870, an answer was filed under protest and issue joined. At
the December Term 1870, without objection, the company being
representcd by counsel and defending, the case was tried to a jury
resulting in a verdict and judgment for plaintiff.
The defendant demanded and was allowed a second trial under
the statute upon giving the required undertaking. This was given
January 17th 1871, and the case was again placed on the trial
docket. At the March Term 1871, to wit, April 26th 1871, which
was more than seven months after petition for removal was filed,
and after the next session of the Circuit Court had commenced, without the transcript and copies being filed in the Circuit Court, the case
was again tried without objection, the defendant being present and
defending, which resulted in a second judgment for plaintiff. A
motion for a new trial was made on several grounds, but neither in
that motion nor in arrest of judgment was any objection made to
the jurisdiction of the court.
The motion was overruled and a bill of exceptions taken, on the
causes assigned in the motion, but no motion in arrest of judgment
was filed. Error was prosecuted in the District Court, where one of
the causes assigned was, that the Common Pleas erred in refusing
to grant a removal. Since the case came into this court, the
defendant in error has filed an answer, showing that no papers were
ever filed in the Circuit Court of the United. States. Here we
have unmistakable evidence of waiver. The time for transfer had
elapsed when the second trial was obtained at the request of the
company. The condition of the bond it had given had been broken
by neglect or failure, intentional, as we must infer, to perfect the
transfer.
Until the papers were filed in the Circuit Court that court had
no jurisdiction, except by certiorari or other prosess, on motion of
the company to compel the clerk of the Common Pleas to certify
up the papers. The case was not then in the Circuit Court. Its
jurisdiction had not attached. The company had abandoned, fbr
the time being at least, the intention to remove, and had concluded
to take its chances in the state court. As was said in 32 Mich.,
before cited, it could not "take its chances on the result and afterIV
wards question the jurisdiction."
The Act of Congress provides, that after petition and bond are
filed the state court can proceed no further in the cause. This
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is a provision in favor of the party seeking the removal. It is
personal to him and does not divest the state court of jurisdiction
over the subject-matter, but only over the person at his election.
it is said that after petition and bond filed all further proceedings
of the state court are coram non judice and void. Numerous
decisions may be cited to this effect. Is it true in an unqualified
sense ? The opinion of the majority concedes that it is not, when
stress is laid on the fact that the company saved its rights by
answering under protest, and by assigning for. error in the District
Court the order of the Common Pleas refusing a removal. If all
subsequent proceedings were corarn non judice and void, no exception is necessary. If the court has no further power, and if some
of the dicta are "that consent cannot give jurigdiction," then all
further proceedings are void, whether under protest or objection, or
by consent. The court had jurisdiction over the subject-matter.
It is not within the power of Congress to divest it of this, but only
of jurisdiction over the person, and that only at his option. Iad
the company complied with the Act of Congress, and filed copies
of the papers in the Circuit Court, I concede the state court would
have been completely ousted of all jurisdiction. Until that was
done the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court did not attach; that is
conceded. But according to the logic of the majority the case is
out of the state court, but not in the Circuit Court. Where is it?
I concede, also, that if a party after removal is refused, stands
on his rights, and continues to contest the case in the state court,
and does not waive the question of jurisdiction, he may, after trial
and final judgment, prosecute error on that ground. In such case
he can have ample protection either in the state or federal courts.
What I deny is, that he can speculate on his chances, after filing
his petition and bond, by going to trial without objection, after he
has failed to transfer the case, and if he gets defeated, then object
to the jurisdiction of the, court, but if he succeeds, insist on such
jurisdiction. To have the benefit of the Act of Congress, he should
comply with its provisions, as he is free to do, whhtever the state
court does, and in defiance of any order it may make. Much stress
is laid on certain decisions, where the point now -under discussion wasnot raised or considered, as to the effect that after the petition and
bond for a removal have been filed, all further proceedings are
coramr von Judice, and as is said here utterly invalid. While this
-

may be, and probably is so, where a party stands on his rights and
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complies with the conditions prescribed by the Act of Congress,
it cannot be true in case of a waiver of the riglht to remove. The
case of ladley v. .Dunlap, 10 Ohio St. 1, is a unanimous decision
of the Supreme Court directly in conflict with this theory. In
that case, the petition and bond for a removal was filed by the defendant, and the motion for such removal was overruled. After this,
lie answered to the merits, reserving his right of removal. Upon
final trial, judgment was rendered on the merits against the defendant.
He appealed to the District Court, and there renewed his motion
for a removal, and the whole case was reserved for decision in the
Supreme Court. The syllabus on that point is, "Where an application for the removal of a cause has been improperly overruled by
the .ourt of Common Pleas, such error does not effect the jurisdiction of the Court of Common Pleas so as to render its judgment in
the case void. But the application, if renewed in the District
Court upon appeal, should be granted."
In considering this point the learned judge who delivered the
opinion (SCOTT, J.) vigorously combats the doctrine laid down in
Gordon v. Longest, 16 Peters 97 (much relied on in this case), "that
every step subsequently taken in the exercise of jurisdiction is coram
non judice." He says, "If we are to understand from this expression, that where a state court erroneously declines to certify a cause
and proceeds to trial and final judgment therein such judgment is
not merely voidable for error, but absolutely void for want of jurisdiction, it would seem to follow that no attempted appeal from such
void judgment could confer jurisdiction on the District Court, and
for want thereof, we would only direct the cause to be stricken from
the docket. * * * But as the Court of Common Pleas had unquestioned jurisdiction, both of the parties and' subject-matter of this
controversy, prior to and at the time when the defendants moved
that the 'court might certify it to the federal court, we do not
think that an error of judgment in overruling the motion could oust
the jurisdiction of the court." Again, "Full jurisdiction having
once attached it must be held to continue until the case is disposed
of, either by certificate or final judgment or decree, however erroneously it may have been exercised." This is an emphatic authority
that such subsequent proceedings by the state court are merely
voidable and not "utterlu invalid."
In Bppinger v. ITnsurance Co., 4 Am. Law Rec. 585, the view
now contended for was directly affirmed. That was the decision

776

,,UERAILWAY PO. v. srRINGER.

of Judge WELKER (concurred in, it is said, by Justice SwAyI4E)

in the Circuit Court for the Western District of Ohio. How
efforts at removal were made of the first, it is said, speaking of
the effect of a failure to file copies of the papers in the Circuit Court, "it would se~m, from the fact that the defendant,
after having filed the first petition for removal, failed to file
copies of the process, &c., in this court, and filed an answer in the
state court, and then went to trial on the issue made aswell as the
filing of a subsequent petition, affidvit, &c., for removal in 1874,
that it had waived any right to file the papers under that petition."
The second petition'for removal was filed Februiry 23d 1874.
The first day of the next session of the Circuit Court was April 7th
1874, and copies of the proper papers were not filed until August
26th 1875. After this petition was filed, and the transfer refused
by the state court, the pirties.proceeded to trial, and judgment was
rendered on a verdict against the party seeking a removal. On
error to the District Court this judgment was reversed, and then
the Common Pleas granted the'order for removal, after which copiq
of the proper papers were filed in the Circuit Court. On-&motion
in the Circuit Court to. dismiss. t6e action, Judge WELKR held
that it was the duty of the party to comply with the Act of Congress by filing such papers, regardless of the action- of the state
court, and by the failure to file the papers in time the Circuit Court
did not obtain j'urisdiction and therefore struck the case from the
docket. Here the Court of Comihon Pleas, as in the case. at bar,
refusea to order a removal, andproceeded to trial and final judgment against the party moving for a transfer. The cases axe also
alike in the fact that no steps were taken to transfer the case by
filing the papers in, the Circuit Court. It settles the -proposition
that the party must comply with the Act of -Congress before the
case is transferred from the'jurisdiction ,of the state court. Most
of the cases relied bn in support of the opinion in this case simply
decide tha" the right to'have the case removed is perfected'by filing
the petition and proper security,, not that the case is actually
removed.'
The first step to a removal is, to file the petition ana bond. This
is a condition precedent to the removal and*not a removal. The
removal consists in filing the papers in the Circuit 0ourt. A party
may perform the conditioi 'precedent, may perfect his right and
still not exercise it after all. After the right to a removal is per-
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fected, the state court is to proceed no further without the assent
of the mover; but when it appears no removal has taken place
within the proper time the presumption is the party has abandoned
the removal. In Insurance (o. v. Dunn, 19 Wall. 214, the trans-fer was completed and the case was on the docket of the Circuit
Court, and stress is laid on that fact.' It is said, "the cause was
out of the Common Pleas and in the Circuit Court." Again:
"The conditions prescribed having been complied with, the Act
of Congress expressly required the state court to proceed no
further in the suit." Again, "It is not denied that the require-.
ments of the Act of Congress have been fully complied with."
In Dart v. MclKinney, 9 Blatch. 359 ; Fisk v. The Undon P'assenger Railroad 0o, 8 Blatch. 299 ; Dennistown v. Dralper, 5
Blatch. 336; Osgood v. Ch. D. & F. Railroad Co., 6 Bisel 332;
Ellerman v. N. 0., 11l. & T. Railroad Co., 2 Wood 120; French
v. Hay, 22 Wall. 250, and several other cases we have examined,
where the doctrine relied on "that all proceedings subsequent
to the petition and bond are coram non judice," were cases which
had been actually transferred. It is conceded that in such cases.
the jurisdiction of the state court is ousted.
Our claim is, that when the conditions for removal have not been!
fully complied with by filing copies of the papers in the Circuit.
Court within the time fixed, the proceedings in the state court are:
only suspended and may be resumed again by consent of the party
moving, or as I think it may be resumed without his consent afterit is made to appear the cause has not been transferred.
I fully agree with the opinion that "so long as the plaintiff in
error continued to stand upon and assert his right of removal * * *
all subsequent proceedings were utterly invalid." But it is denied
that in this case the plaintiff in error "continued to stand upon
and assert its rights." T2he record shows that it has slept upon
its rights for several months instead of standing on them with due
diligence.
I am aware that numerous dicta and general remarks of eminent
judges may be cited in support of the propositions, that all proceedings of the state court after petition and bond are filed for a
removal are "c oram non judice and void, utterly invalid, &c.,"
and that, "consent cannot give jurisdigtion" (per SWAYNE, J.), 19
How. 224; but it is believed no carefully adjudicated case can be
found, where the point now under consideration was decided, that
VOL. XXVI.-98
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supports the opinion in this case. That consent cannot give juris-diction over the subject-matter is obvious, but when the axiom is
:applied to the person of a litigant in a court, having complete authority to hear and determine the subject-matter, it is a gross misapplication of an admitted principle, not only unsupported by authority, but in violation of both principle and authority. All know
how unsafe it is to rely on general remarks found in reported cases,
not necessary to the decision of this point. Such generalities are
dangerous guides and likely to mislead. It is only when the case
in hand requires that the judicial mind shall be concentrated on a
given point that its conclusions should be adopted as evidence
of the law, or be entitled to weight. It is better to be guided by
the certain light of sound legal principles, aided by reason and
authority if we wish to reach a correct conclusion.
NOTE.-Since the foregoing dissent was written, the Supreme
Court has, in the case of The P. Railroad "Co. v. People, not yet
reported, fully affirmed the principles, that a foreign corporation
-operating a railroad in Ohio under the laws of this state, derives
all its powers and franchises to do so from Ohio laws, and.is as to
all acts done under such powers and franchises a domestic and not
a foreign corporation. The opinion in that case fully sustains conclusions reached in the dissent in the case of The B. J- 0. Rail.road Co. v. Cary, supra.
ASIIBURN, J.,. concurred

in this dissent.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
THE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY v. JOHN HENLY.
An insurance company issued a policy against fire, for five years, the insured
paying the first year's premium in cashand giving'his note promising to pay a sum"
named on March 1st of the succeeding year, a similar sum on the same day of the
next year, and so on for the four years. The policy contained a clause that in
case of default of payment of any instalment of the premiums due upon this note
for thirty days, the insurer should not be liable and the policy should become void,
but that upon payment the policy should revive, and the liability of the insurer
again attach,.&c. Held, that the policy was voidable at the option of the insurer
only ; that the premium note was not void or voidabld by the insured, and he
could not escape his liability upon it by making default; and that at the end of
the five years the insurer could recover the amount of the note.

APPEAL

from the Wayne Circuit Court.
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This was an action by the appellant against the appellee, upon
a promissory note, signed by the appellee, in the following form,
"For value received on Policy No. 81.130, dated the 9th day of
March 1872, issued by the American Insurance Company of Chicago, Illinois, I promise to pay said company the sum of seven dollars and fifty cents on the 1st day of March 1873, and seven dollars and fifty cents on the 1st day of March 1874, and seven dollars
and fifty cents on the 1st day of March 1875, and seven dollars
and fifty cents on the 1st day of March 1876, without interest."
The facts appear in the opinion, which was delivered by
PErniNs, J.-The defendant answered, admitting the execution
of the note, but averring that he is not liable on said note because
"said note was given for insurance of the property hereinafter mentioned; the amount of each instalment of said note is the premium
charged by the plaintiff for the year succeeding the date at which
the instalment is to become due, by the terms of the note; that at
the time defendant signed said note, it was attached to an application for insurance with plaintiff, which said application contained an
agreement that if any instalment upon the premiums shall remain
due and unpaid thirty days, then the policy issued upon the application, in consideration of such instalment, shall be null and void
until the same is paid; that said application was signed at the same
time the note was signed, and was an application for the insurance
for which the note was given, and was a part of the contract for
said insurance, a copy of which application is filed herewith and
made part hereof." This application is addressed to The American
Insurance Company of Chicago, asks for insurance upon the property therein described in the sum of $1500, and concludes thus:
"The foregoing is a correct description of the property to be insured
on which the insurance will be predicated. If any instalment upon
the premium shall remain due, unpaid thirty days, then the policy
issued upon the application, in consideration of such instalment,
shall be null and void until the same is paid. JOHN HENLY, applicant."
Defendant further says, that afterwards the plaintiff issued to
defendant on said application, a policy of insurance, and defendant
received said policy by mail *some time after he had signed said
note and application, and after he had paid the cash premium for
the year 1872, and had not seen said policy until he received the
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same as aforesaid, and was not acquainted with its provisions in
reference to the charter of plaintiff, which policy, among 9ther
things, contained a condition that the plaintiff shall not be liable
for loss, if default shall have been made by the assured in the payment of any instalment of premiums due upon the note aforesaid,
or in case of the assignment of the policy upon the instalment
note of the assignee for the space of thirty days after such instalment shall become due, by the terms of said note; and said policy
contains the further condition that when a promissory note is given
by the assured for the cash premium it shall be considered a payment, provided such note is paid at or before maturity; but it is
expressly understood and agreed by and between the parties hereto,
that should any loss or damage accrue to the property hereby insured, and the note given for the cash premium 'or any part thereof
remains unpaid and past due at the time of such logs or damage,
then this policy shall be void.
The policy is made an exhibit, and it contains this further provision "that on payment by the assured or assigns of all instalments of premiums due'under this policy and the instalment note
given thereon, the liability of this company on this policy shall
again attach and this policy be in force from and after such payment, unless this policy shall be void and inoperative from some
other cause."
Defendant further says, that long before the commencement
of .this suit, when the first instalment of the said note fell .due,
defendant made default of payment of said instalment, in pursuance
of the terms of the contract between plaintiff and defendant, as
stated in the application and policy, and then at that time, elected
to discontinue his insurance with plaintiff and notified plaintiff
thereof; that the instalments of said note were-the premium charged
by the plaintiff for each year beginning on'the 9th day of March
18783, and ending on the 9th day of March 1877, respectively, being
seven dollars and fifty'cents for each year, and that the premium
for 1872 was paid by defendant cash in advance, March 9th 1872,
wherefore, &c. To this answer a demurrer was overruled and
exception entered.
The plaintiff replied that it is a corporation organized and incorporated under and in pursuance of an Act of the General Assembly
of the state of Illinois, approved February 15th 1855, and the
several acts amendatory thereof, enacted by said General Assem-
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bly, copies of all which acts are filed herewith and made part hereof, and which constitute the charter of said insurance company,
-which charter is made a part of said insurance policy, thus : "This
policy is made and accepted upon the above-expressed conditions,
and the charter and by-laws of this company, which are to be
resorted to and used to explain the rights and obligations of the
parties hereto in all cases not herein otherwise specially provided
for, and which are hereby made a part of this policy." And the
plaintiff avers that said defendant made application to it at Chicago,
whither it had, under an amendment to its charter, removed its
principal office, for a policy of insurance in the sum of $1500,
extending over a period of five years, on the property described,
which application was accepted by the company, the policy issued,
&c., described in the answer; that at the time defendant executed
the note sued on to secure the different instalments as described in
said note, that the payment of said instalments as they should
become due, was the consideration on which said policy of insurance
issued. "And the plaintiff avers that defendant failed to pay said
instalments and the interest thereon; that they remain due and
unpaid; that said insured: property has not been destroyed, &c.;
that on default of payment of said instalments severally, notice
thereof was given to the defendant by the plaintiff, as required by
the charter of the company, whereby all of said instalments became
due- after thirty days, &c.; wherefore the plaintiff demands judgment, &c.
A demurrer to this reply was sustained, and final judgment rendered for -the defendant. The assignment of errors alleges that the
Circuit Court erred: 1. In overruling the demurrer to the answer.
2. In sustaining the demurrer to the reply.
This was a suit by the insurance company against the assured
on his premium note.
The answer seems to set up two grounds of defence : 1. That the
policy' of insurance is variant, in its terms, from the application.
2. That it became utterly void, as to all parties, on the default of
the assured in paying the instalment of the premium secured by
the note sued on.
The policy was issued by the plaintiff soon after the 9th of
March 1872, and this suit was commenced upon the premium note
June 9th 1876. During all this time no objection appears to have
been made on the ground that the policy varied from the contract
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pursuant to which it was issued, and it is not claimed that it is not
in accordance with the charter of the company, of the provisions
of which the assured would be presumed to have notice, and which
are expressly made part of the policy. There is nothiiig in this
point. The assured did not put his refusal to pay instalments due
upon this ground.
The policy accords with the application and neither or both make
the policy void, on the failure of the assured to pay an instalment
of the premium note, but only voidable at the option of the insurance company. It is no part of the contract that the assured may
at any time absolve himself from the contract, by voluntarily breaking it. This is plain from the terms of the application and policy,
both of which declare that the policy shall be void during the continuance of such nonpayment, clearly implying; what the policy
expressly asserts, that its operation shall be restored whenever such
payment shall be made. Now, if it became absolutely void, forfeited by the simpld fact of nonpayment, the subsequent payment
could not continue its existence and operation. The word void is
frequently carelessly used for voidable, as the meaning of the sentences or contracts in which it is used clearly shows.
The sense of this part of the" policy then might be expressed
thus: that during the continuance of a default, of the assured in
making payment of an instalment of the premium note, the policy
should be voidable, and may be avoided at the option of the company.
And, had a loss occurred to the insured during such default,
whereupon he had proceeded to sue the company upon the policy
for the loss, the company would no doubt have defeated his recovery by setting up his defaulty and electing to avoid the policy,
But the question here is, not whether the assured, being in
default, could recover from the company upon a loss, but whether
the company, not being in default, can recover from the assured,
who is, on his premium pote.
If the stipulation in the policy had been such as rendered the
contract utterly void, it is not necessary for us now to say what
might have been its effect on the right of the company to sue.
The policy is not void but simply voidable hy the company, and
the premium note is not void nor, voidable by the assured, the
payee thereof. He retains his policy, the company retains the
note against him. By the terms of the policy, if he pays the note
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without suit, such payment will restore the suspended animation
of the policy.

If he pays it at the end of an execution, the pay-

ment will have the same effect.

We are satisfied the company

may maintain this suit upon the note.

The note was given

upon a valid and continuing consideration.
The contract upon
which it was given has not been forfeited, is not void; the company has the possession of, and the property in the note. She
may maintain suit upon it, thereby if she collects it renewing her
liability on the policy.
This is not a case of alienation of the property insured, but
simply a failure to pay an instalment due oil a premium note.

Alienation, as a general rule, invalidates a policy whether it is so
provided in the policy or not, because it terminates all interest of

the assured therein, whereupon the policy becomes inoperative and
ceases to have any validity as an indemnifying contract: Wood on

Fire Insurance 537. Such is not the effect of the failure on the
part-of the assured to pay his premium note. The court erred in
overruling the demurrer to the answer.

The judgment is reversed with costs; cause remanded for further
proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

United States Circuit Court.

District of Colorado.

ASHER A. WHITE v. COLORADO CENTRAL RAILROAD
COMPANY.
The storage by a warehouseman of gunpowder in large quantities in the same
room with other goods liable to be ignited by a fire or explosion of the powder, is
negligence in itself, and where the fact is undisputed the court may pronounce
it negligehce as matter of law.
A railroad company or other common carrier keeping goods in its own warehouse until called for, is a bailee for hire, and liable as a warehouseman under
the above rule, although the keeping of the goods is not a portion of its regular
business as a carrier, but rather nn appendage for the convenience of its patrons.
Negligence may be the proximate cause of injury, although it is not the sole or
even the immediate cause.
A railroad company having transported dry goods as a carrier, stored them in
its warehouse until the consignee should call for them. In the other end of the
same warehouse, with large doors fMr putting in and taking out goods between,
was stored a quantity of gunpowder. A fire occurred, without the fault of the
company, by which the goods were burned up. An instruction to the jury that
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the storage of powder in the 'same warehouse was negligence, and that if they
should be satisfied from the evidence that the goods could and would have been
saved had it not been for the fear of the powder which kept the firemen out of the
building, the railroad company would be liable, held, to be correct.
MOTION for new trial.
On the 1st of January 1878, plaintiff's
intestate shipped a lot of dry goods and clothing, from Georgetown
to Denver, over defendant's line. The goods were received at Denver and placed in defendant's warehouse on the morning of the 3d
of the same month. Two days later they were destroyed by fire,
which originated in the building without fault of defendant. The
plaintiff brought this action to recover the value of the goods so
destroyed.

The further facts appear in the opinion of the court, which was
delivered by
HALLETT, J.-As to the first count in the declaration, in which
plaintiff sought to charge defendant as a common carrier, the jury
have found against the plaintiff, and thus all questions arising on
that count have been eliminated from the case. On the second
count, in which defendant is charged with negligence as. a warehouseman, the jury found for plaintiff in the sum of $4704.75, and
the motion now to be considered is directed against that verdict.
It seems from the evidence that defendant's warehouse -*as a
long wooden structure, one hundred feet or more in length, and
that the company's offices for transacting its freight business were
kept in one end of it. These offices were divided off from the main
building by partitions, and the remainder of the building was used
for storing goods. At about the centre of the building, on each
side and communicating with the part which was used for storage,
were large doors, through which the goods were passed, when received into or taken out of the building. The plaintiff's goods when
received were put in that end of the building which did not contain
the offices, and, of course, at some distance from the doors last mentioned.
By the same train which brought plaintiff's goods a quantity
of gunpowder, amounting to about one hundred and sixty kegs,
N'as also received, and this powder was put, by defendant, in the
same room with plaintiff's goods, but upon the other side of the
doors before mentioned, and towards the offices which were at that
end of the building, so that with reference to the doors, which
opened through the warehouse, it may be correct to, say that the
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offices and the powder were in one end of the building, while the
plaintiff's goods were in the other end of the same building. But
the powder was in fact pretty near the door on that side where it
lay, and between the oJfices and the plaintiff's goods. The fire,
which destroyed the building and the goods, when first discover~d,
was in the roof immediately above the offices, and, of course, at
some distance from the plaintiff's goods. Thus it appears that the
fire was in one end of the building and the plaintiff's goods in the
other, while the powder was between the fire and the goods, oil the
same side of the large doors, before mentioned, as the fire. This
was the situation, when members of the fire department arrived in
considerable force on the ground with their apparatus, for the purpose of extinguishing the fire. The weather was cold and some
delay occurred before water was obtained, but three or four streams
were soon brought to bear, so that under ordinary circumstances
the flames might have been suppressed before half the building was
destroyed.
One witness testifies that there was an opportunity to cut off the
fire at the large doors before mentioned, by carrying the water in
at that place and playing on the fire from the inside. But nothing
of this kind was attempted, and, indeed, the firemen would not go
within seventy or eighty feet of the building on the outside, because
they feared injury from the powder. Some testimony was given
at the trial, to show that this fear was unfounded; but if tie experts, who testified on that point, had been present at the fire to
explain the properties of gunpowder to the terrified firemen, it is
doubtful whether the explanation would have been entirely satisfactory. The theory advanced is, that metallic cans, in which the
powder was put, are so expanded and cracked by the beat of a
burning building, that the powder escapes and in that condition,
if ignited, it produces only a 'flash, which is not at all dangerous
to those who are outside of the building. If, however, one who is
inside the building, swallows th/e fire, as one of the witnesses said,
it is deadly, so that even on this theory it was not safe to go into
the building at the large doors before mentioned, for the purpose
of suppressing the fire. So, too, a prudent person might well be
excused from assuming that all of the cans would be cracked and

laid open by the heat so as to render them harmless. Altogetl:er
it may be said that this evidence does not prove nor tend to prove
that the powder was not dangerous to life in the situation where
VoL. XVI.-99
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it was found, but merely that the workmen might have approached
the building more closely without danger to themselves. Whether
they could have worked more effectively at a distance from the
building of twenty-five or thirty feet than.at a distance of eighty
feet does not appear, but may be a matter of reasonable inference.
It does, however, appear that the gunpowder prevented the firemen from going in at the large do61s before mentioned with hose.
and there operating against the fire. All the witnesses agree- that
this mbvcmcnt would, under the circumstances, have been full of
danger, and it seems probable that it was not made for that reason.
One witness testifies that he suggested it to the firemen, and was
answered that it was dangerous to go -there on account of the
powder. Looking to the form of the building, the fact that it was
built of wood and the situation of plaintiff's goods with referefice
to the fire, it also seems probalsle that the goods would have beev
saved, if the powder had not been stored in the building.
Upon the evidence then, sho.wing or tending to show that the
loss of the goods was due to the presence of powder in the warehouse, the court charged the jury as follows :"As to the second cause, of action, the liability of defendant,
if any exists, depends upon the effect of storing powder in the
warehouse, if any were stored there. You are advised that storing a considerable quantity of powder in the same house with
plaintiff's goods was negligent conduct, and if the loss was occasioned by the presence of powder in the house, the defendant is
liable. In order to fix such liability, however, it must appear to
you from the evidence, that the loss was certainly occasioned or
produced by that cause. If those who were engaged in suppressing the fire would have been able to save plaintiff's goods and
would have done so if no powder had been kept in the tuilding,
the defendant may be held; but if this is a doubtful matter, and
it is uncertain whether the presence of the powder in the house
occasioned the loss, the. defendant is not liable. Upon that point
you remember what the witnesses said about it. You determine
as well as you can whether this loss certainly proceeded from that
cause, from the presence of the powder. If it is doubtful in your
minds upon the evidence here, whether the loss was occasioned by
that, that is to :say, if withdrawing the powder from the house, you
think it still doubtful whether the goods would have been saved,
the defendant cannot be held liable upon that. The only act of
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negligence, as it seems to me from the evidence here, was the
putting of the powder there, and you must be able to ascribe the
loss to that cause, and certainly to that, if you are to hold the
defendant upon that. That is the position in which that matter
stands."
That this principle is applicable to ordinary warehousemen would
appear to be beyond question. To store or deposit gunpowder in
large quantities in any place in a city where it will endanger life
and property is a public nuisance: Chlteatham v. Shwaron, 1 Swan.
213; llIgers v. Maleolm, 6 Hill 292; Ha v. Coloes, 2 N. Y.
159. The ease in 6 Hill shows that the party storing the powder
will be liable for any damage that may result from it, and the same
view is expressed in some of the text books: Addison on Torts,
-vol. 1, 308; Wood on Nuisance, sect. 142. Warehouses are usually,
if not always, located in cities where the danger fiom fire is great,
and of course keepers of such houses must provide against the danger with reasonable care. It is often difficult to determine whether
such care has been used, but no embarrassment is felt respecting
the point now under consideration.
With reference to warehousemen in general, we have only to ask
whether a prudent man would store a large quantity of gunpowder
in a building with other goods in a populous city ; whether that is
the usual and ordinary course of business, to decide the question of
negligence. But it is said that a railway company, which keeps
warehouses for the convenience of the public and as a necessary
appendage to the business of a carrier, is not to be put upon the
footing of ordinary warehousemen; that the company is not a
warehouseman by choice, but only through the negligence of its
patrons, who will not take away their goods as soon as they are
received at the company's depot; that as the company may lawcarries,
fully carry all things, so may it lawfully store whatever itrisk
the
himself
and he who intrusts goods to its charge takes upon
of such storage. These suggestions are not without weight, but it is
believed they ought not to prevail against the general rule, which
exacts from a bailee for hire reasonable diligence in the care of
property intrusted to him. That a railway company, keeping the
property of its patrons in its own warehouse for a reasonable time,
until it shall be called for, is to be regarded as a bailee for hire
and not as a naked depository is now fully settled : Norway Plains
C,., Y. Boston and M1aine Railroad, 1 Gray 273; Wharton on
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Negligence, sect. 478. As such, no reason is seen for relieving it
from the duties and responsibilities which attach to that character
of bailment.
It must be borne in mind that the company was not bound to
carry the powder on its railway, and still less was it required to
store so dangerous an article in its warehouse: Boston J Albany
Railroad Co. v. Shanly, 107 Masi. 575; Wharton on Negligence,
sect. 856. If the company was willing to incur the risk of carrying powder, it must be assumed that it was also willing to take upon
itself the liabilities incident to such risk. So also it may be said,
the matter of storing the powder was disconnected from and
entirely independent of the carrying. Although the company had
carried the powder, it was not bound to put it. in its warehouse.
The consignee might have been required to take away the powder
in the very hour of its arrival at Denver, or it might have been
sent to some warehouse prepared and kept'for storing such articles.
Putting it in the warehouse of the company was a voluntary act
carrying danger to the propeity of others, and therefore wrongfib
in itself. That it was not an exercise of the reasonable care in
preserving the plaintiff's propery, which the law enjoined, seems
to be too plain for argument.
Another objection to the charge is, that the powder, if at all
instrumental in ihe destruction of plaintiff's goods, was not the
proximate cause of that result. To support this objection'insurance
cases are cited, in which it has been held that loss occasioned by
explosion of powder may be connected with the fire which ignited
the powder as the proximate cause. Hence it is claimed that in
all such cases the fire and not the powder is the proximate cause
of loss. But there may be; and usually there is, more than one
agency or means of producing loss. Take,- for instance, the car
loaded with oil, which escaped from the comdpany's servant and ran
down a steep grade and came in collision with a locomotive, which
set fire to the oil, and, thence it was communicated to plaintiff's
house, the fire and oil united in the destruction of plaintiff's house,
and the cause of all the mischief was a defective brake on the car.
If there. was negligence in respect to any one of these things, the
person chargeable with such negligence was responsible for the loss:
Oil Creek and Allegheny Railway Co. v. Keighron, 74 Penna.
St. 316.
So also where dry grass was negligently allowed to remain in
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heaps near defendants' railway, and fire was communicated to such
heaps by a passing engine, and thence carried by the wind a distance of two hundred yards to plaintiff's cottage, which was
destroyed, the defendant was held liable: Smith v. Lowdon and
S. W. Railway Co., Law Rep. 6 C. P. 14; Law Rep., 5 C. P.
98. The fire was, of course, a cause of mischief, but the wind and
dry grass were also efficient in communicating the fire to the building, and the negligence was in respect to the grass only. If defendant had set the grass on fire negligently, or, if that had been
possible, had caused the wind to blow, it would have been liable for
the loss in the saine manner.
On the same principle it was held, in Massachusetts, that one
who negligently cut the hose, with which water was supplied for
suppressing a fire, was liable for the damage occasioned by his
wrongful act: Mtetallic Gompression Gasting Co. v. Fitchburg
RailroadCo., 109 Mass. 278. There, as in the case at bar, it was
contended that the proximate cause of loss was the fire rather than
the act of the defendant. But the court was of a different opinion,
saying that "when a man cuts off the hose, through which firemen
are throwing a stream on a burning building, and thereupon the
building is consumed for the want of water to extinguish it, his act
is to be regarded as the direct and efficient cause of the injury."
In all these cases it may be said that the fire is a proximate cause
of loss, but it does not follow that it is the only cause standing in that
relation to the result. And so, while it is true that plaintiff's goods
were in fact destroyed by fire, it is also true that the gunpowder in
the warehouse, by keeping the workmen from the fire, may have
contributed to the loss in such way as will make it a proximate
cause. "Negligence may be the proximate cause of an injury of
which it is not the sole or immediate cause :" Shearman and Redfield on Negligence, sect. 10.
Without further discussion of what seems to be plain, we have no
doubt the powder was near enough as a cause of the loss to make the
defendant liable for its negligence in putting it in the warehouse, if,
as the jury have found, it directly contributed to the result, and
this objection must be overruled.
The defendant further relies on the form of the instruction,
claiming that the question of negligence was improperly withdrawn
from the jury. It is not denied, and it cannot be successfully
denied, that where the facts are established negligence may be a
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necessary inference of the law, to be decided by the court: Shearman and IRedfield on Negligence, sect. 11; Tarwater v. .Hannibal
and St. Josel)h Railroad Co., 42 Mo. 198; Pittsburghand Convcllsi-ille iailroadCo. v. JMfclurg, 56 Penna. St. 294.
In some cases, as where the conclusion to be drawn is not direct
and certain, the rule is otherwise: Railroad Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall.
663. But here the facts lead in but one direction.
It was admitted at the trial that defendants' warehouse was in
the city of Denver, and whether powder was s.tored there, although
it was not denied, was submitted to the jury'on the evidence. It
is difficult to discover any other fact that entered into the question
of negligence, unless it be the dangerous properties of powder, and
perhaps that is the point in controversy.
In the argument of this motion at'the bar, c6unsel were understood as saying that the testimony of witnesses at the trial had
raised a doubt as to the effect of powder -exploding in a burning
building. And if the question to be decided should be as to the
effect of such explosion on the building itself and the contents
thereof, their position would not be untenable. The testimony
tended to prove that neither the building nor the goods therein
were much injured by the explosion. But this is not the point to
which the evidence was directed. As before explained, thd question was whether the firemen were reasonably deterred by the presence of powder in the building, from effective work in extinguishing the fire. And so far was the-evidence from showing or tending
to show that the firemen were not so deterred that it tended rather
to establish the inference of danger to life from the presence of
that article, at least as to all those who "should attempt to enter the
building. So that the evidence referred to did not in any way
affect the question of negligence, and if it bore on the other point,
as whether the firemen were in fact hindered from operating against
the fire, that matter was submitted to the decision of the jury on the
evidence. Aside from. this I cannot believe that it is in any case
necessary or proper to ask a jury to find whether gunpowder is a
dangerous compound. The fact is of universal notoriety, familiar
to all men, and needs neither finding nor proof to establish it.
What would be thought of the demand for such proof in a prosecution for assault with intent to kill and murder ? Would it be
said that the government must show that the gun was loaded with
powder. and ball, and that powder is an explosive substance

